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Executive summary
In the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis, regulators have rushed to strengthen 
banking supervision and implement bank resolution regimes. While such resolution regimes 
are welcome as a means to reintroduce market discipline and reduce the reliance on taxpay-
er-funded bailouts, the effects on the wider banking system have not been properly consid-
ered.
A macro approach to resolution is also needed, which should consider (i) the contagion 
effects of bail-in and (ii) the continuing need for a fiscal backstop to the financial system.
For bail-in to work, it is important that bail-inable bank bonds are largely held outside the 
banking sector, which is currently not the case. Stricter capital requirements could push them 
out of the banking system.
The organisation of the fiscal backstop is crucial for the stability of the global banking 
system. Single-point-of-entry resolution of international banks is only possible for the very 
largest countries or for countries working together, including in terms of sharing the burden 
of a potential bank bailout. The euro area has adopted the burden-sharing approach in its 
banking union. This Policy Contribution recommends completing banking union.
Other countries have taken a stand-alone approach, which leads to multi-
ple-point-of-entry resolution of international banks headquartered in those countries and 
contributes to fragmentation of the global banking system.
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1 Introduction
The focus of the regulatory reform agenda is shifting from supervision to resolution of 
financial institutions. While supervision remains important to reduce the likelihood of bank 
failures, it cannot prevent such failures in a market economy. A strong resolution regime with 
bail-in of debtholders is considered to be important to reinforce market discipline. But the 
leading economies, including the European Union and the United States, which have adopted 
and implemented resolution regimes, risk making the same mistakes they made with super-
vision.
Before the Great Financial Crisis, supervision took a micro approach, focusing on the 
strength and soundness of financial institutions without looking at the wider financial system. 
Financial imbalances, such as the housing bubble in the US, were allowed to build up in 
the run up to the Great Financial Crisis, because nobody felt responsible for monitoring the 
stability of the financial system as a whole (the macro dimension). Since the crisis, countries 
have adopted macro-prudential supervision in addition to micro-prudential supervision.
But history seems to repeat itself. The new resolution regimes are overly focused on the 
resolution of individual banks, with only a minor exemption for systemic risk. Lawyers are 
excited about the special features of bank resolution legislation as lex specialis, while econo-
mists are thrilled about the incentive effects of bail-in: managers (as agents of the sharehold-
ers) will reduce bank risk to minimise the possibility of bail-in, which would dilute existing 
shareholders. This all assumes that resolution of individual banks is feasible.
But the impact of resolution measures applied to one bank on the other banks has not 
been properly considered. The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of resolution 
measures in calm times and in crisis times. Our main claim is that we need a macro approach 
to resolution that complements the micro rules. Moreover, it might not always be possible to 
avoid a conflict of objectives between the micro and macro approaches. For these cases we 
have to define a hierarchy of objectives (Schoenmaker and Kremers, 2015).
While bail-in is presented as substitute for bailout, bail-ins and bailouts are often com-
plementary, allowing banks to be resolved without jeopardising the financial system. The 
challenge for policymakers is to find the right balance between the two.
2 The need for a macro approach to 
resolution
One of the major reforms ushered in by the Great Financial Crisis is the requirement to bail-
in debt before a possible bailout of a failing bank can take place. The aim of the new bail-in 
regime is to reduce the costs of bank bailouts for taxpayers and thus to reduce moral hazard 
(see Philippon and Salord, 2017, for an excellent overview). While bail-in is appropriate for 
individual idiosyncratic failures, it might not be possible when a systemically important bank, 
or large parts of the banking system, fail. Bail-in of large banks might be adding to – rather 
than dampening – financial panic (Avgouleas and Goodhart, 2015; Chan and Van Wijnbergen, 
2015; Dewatripont, 2014).
Why are micro rules for supervision and resolution not sufficient? The fallacy of compo-
sition argues that the system as a whole behaves differently from its individual components 
(Brunnermeier et al, 2009). This fallacy derives from the fact that, when trying to make them-
selves safer, financial institutions can behave in ways that collectively undermine the stability 
of the system. Selling an asset when the price of risk increases might be a prudent response 
from the perspective of an individual financial institution, but if many financial institutions 
act in this way, the asset price will collapse, forcing financial institutions to take further steps 
Monetary stability
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to rectify the situation. The responses of the financial institutions themselves to such pres-
sures lead to generalised declines in asset prices, and enhanced correlations and volatility 
in asset markets (Shleifer and Vishny, 2011). Another example is that at the top of the credit 
cycle, individual financial institutions look sound because measured risk is low, while the 
financial system becomes increasingly fragile as imbalances build up (Minsky, 1986). Insofar 
as they neglect these general equilibrium effects, micro-prudential policies can be destructive 
at the macroeconomic level.
Contagion
The main reason for this fallacy of composition is the presence of endogenous feedback loops 
(or contagion effects) in the financial system. De Bandt and Hartmann (2002) distinguished 
two main channels in banking markets through which contagion can spread problems from 
one bank to other banks or financial institutions:
• The real or exposure channel (direct contagion) that refers to ‘domino effects’ resulting 
from real exposures, and
• The information channel (indirect contagion) that relates to the contagious withdrawals 
(bank runs) when depositors are imperfectly informed about the type of shocks hitting 
banks and about their physical exposure to each other (asymmetric information).
The major direct contagion effect of bail-in is the spread of losses to the holders of bail-in-
able debt (see also Avgouleas and Goodhart, 2015). While portfolio theory suggests that these 
debt holdings should be widely spread across different types of investors and across coun-
tries (ie international diversification), in practice these bail-inable bonds are primarily held 
within the financial sector, in particular the banking sector, with a strong home bias. Figure 
1 shows that the euro-area banks (ie credit institutions) hold the largest share of bailin-able 
bonds issued by euro-area banks, with holdings close to €500 billion. The next category is 
households, with holdings amounting to €300 billion, followed by insurance companies and 
pension funds with holdings of just over €200 billion (ECB, 2016).
Figure 1: Bail-inable bank debt securities by holding sector (Q1 2016; € billions)
Source: ECB (2016) based on ECB Securities Holdings Statistics by Sector. Note: The percentages above the columns show: * debt hold-
ings relative to total assets; ** debt holdings relative to financial assets. CI = credit institutions; HH = households; IF = investment funds; 
ICPF = insurance companies and pension funds; MMF = money market funds. Bail-inable debt includes senior unsecured and subordinat-
ed bank debt securities. Breakdowns in the chart show issuance by domicile of the issuing bank and holdings by euro-area sectors. 
These findings show there is substantial potential for direct contagion within the financial 
sector. In particular in the banking sector, losses of one or more banks are to a great extent 
directly passed on to other banks in case of bail-in, which might impact their solvency and 
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ability to provide credit. Figure 1 shows that bail-inable bank debt holdings by euro-area 
banks amount to 1.5 percent of total bank assets, while the overall core-equity capital of 
euro-area banks stands at 4.9 percent of total bank assets (Schoenmaker and Véron, 2016). 
This means that up to 31 percent (= 1.5 percent/4.9 percent) of the capital base of euro-area 
banks is at risk. Direct bank contagion is the strongest and most dangerous form of contagion. 
The failure of a large bank, or several medium-sized banks, could cause stress in the banking 
system, potentially leading to a full-blown banking crisis. So, when bail-inable bank debt is 
primarily held within the banking system, the overall stability of the banking system is weak-
ened, should there be a bail-in following a large bank failure or multiple failures of smaller 
banks.
Beck et al (2017) analysed the credit supply and real sector effects of bank bail-in following 
the unexpected failure and subsequent resolution of a major bank in Portugal (Banco Espirito 
Santo in August 2014). They showed that while banks more exposed to the bail-in significantly 
reduced credit supply after the shock, affected firms were able to respond to this credit con-
traction by turning to other sources of funding, including new lending relationships. Never-
theless, Beck et al (2017) found a moderate tightening of credit conditions as well as lower 
investment and employment at firms more exposed to the intervention, particularly small 
and medium-sized firms (SMEs).
Next, the holding of bail-inable bank bonds by insurers and pensions funds is in principle 
useful. Problems at banks are then absorbed by long-term institutional investors, which have 
the capacity to absorb losses in their often internationally diversified portfolios. Using a data-
set covering 1992 to 2003, Slijkerman et al (2013) used extreme value analysis to examine the 
systemic interdependencies within and between the European banking and insurance sectors 
during times of stress. While insurers exhibit a slightly higher interdependency in comparison 
with banks, the inter-dependency between the two sectors turns out to be considerably lower. 
So the insurance (and pension fund) sector is able to provide extra loss-absorbing capacity 
for the banking sector during most crises. However, during a very deep financial crisis such as 
the recent Great Financial Crisis when almost all asset classes are correlated in a downward 
spiral, bail-in would contribute to the pressure in the financial system, intensifying the crisis.
Finally, bail-in might politically not be feasible, when households hold a large part of 
bail-inable debt. This was the case in Italy in early 2017, when the Italian bank Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena (MPS) had to be bailed out (Véron, 2017). Figures 1 and 2 confirm that most 
of the bail-inable bonds of Italian banks are held by Italian households. While this should not 
have happened (mis-selling of risky bonds to small investors should have been prevented 
by the conduct-of-business supervisor), it did happen and MPS was bailed out instead of 
bailed in. Moran (1986) showed vividly how parliament has a strong inclination to demand 
protection of ‘innocent’ depositors (or in this case ‘innocent’ bail-inable debtholders), 
who are also voters. Deposit insurance gives the supervisor more leeway to close banks. 
Accordingly, bail-in of non-professional debtholders is near impossible without some form of 
compensation.
On the information channel (indirect contagion), the act of bail-in of bank debt sends a 
signal that there are problems with a bank and that bail-in is needed to restore capital. While 
a supervisor can tell investors and depositors that the bank is well capitalised after the bail-in, 
why would investors and depositors believe the supervisor? Given the asymmetric informa-
tion, investors and depositors have no way to check whether more problems are looming. 
Chan and van Wijnbergen (2015) examined CoCos (contingent convertible capital), which are 
designed to convert from debt to equity when banks need it most. They show that while the 
CoCo conversion of the issuing bank might bring the bank back into compliance with capital 
requirements, it will nevertheless increase the probability of a bank run happening, because 
conversion is a negative signal to depositors about asset quality.
When bail-inable 
bank debt is primarily 
held within the 
banking system, the 
overall stability of the 
system is weakened, 
should there be a 
bail-in following a 
large bank failure or 
multiple failures of 
smaller banks
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Figure 2: Bail-inable bank debt by domicile of investor (Q1 2016; € billions)
Source: ECB (2016) based on ECB Securities Holdings Statistics by Sector. Note: bail-inable bank debt includes senior unsecured and 
subordinated debt issuances and excludes secured issuances (eg covered bonds) and issuances for which a seniority flag was not 
available in the database.
Moreover, conversion imposes a negative externality on other banks in the system in the 
likely case of correlated asset returns, so bank runs elsewhere in the banking system also 
become more probable and systemic risk will actually increase after conversion. CoCos thus 
lead to a direct conflict between micro- and macro-prudential objectives. The link between 
CoCo conversion and systemic risk highlights the trade-offs that supervisors face in deciding 
to convert CoCos, providing a possible explanation for regulatory forbearance.
Hierarchy of objectives
The micro approach to resolution involves the application of the bail-in rules in order to 
preserve market discipline. The assumption is that upholding market forces has a disciplining 
effect, deterring bank managers from excessive risk-taking and thus fostering the financial 
soundness of individual banks. The macro approach to resolution might forego bail-in, or 
only partially apply bail-in, in order to preserve financial stability. Which approach should 
prevail if there is a conflict of objectives between the micro and macro approaches to resolu-
tion?
If there is a conflict, it is unavoidable to define a hierarchy of objectives. For supervision, 
Schoenmaker and Kremers (2015) argued that the macro-prudential concerns should clearly 
override the micro-prudential concerns in such situations, because the stability of the system 
is more important than the soundness of the components. Figure 3 on the next page depicts 
the hierarchy of objectives for the wider economic and financial system. The same hierarchy 
should be applied to resolution: if the bail-in of one or more (large) banks were to destabi-
lise the financial system (the core banking system or the wider financial system), it would be 
counterproductive. The override should be reversible to prevent moral hazard. Partial bail-in, 
or bail-in at a later stage, should not be ruled out in order to retain the disciplining force of 
bail-in. When a negative bank shock happens, for example, bail-in rules could be temporarily 
(and partially) lifted to avoid a wider financial crisis. But there must be a clear exit. Otherwise 
problems might scale up and become worse.
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Figure 3: Hierarchy of objectives
Source: Schoenmaker and Kremers (2015).
Fiscal backstop
In a full-blown systemic crisis, there is still a need for the government to provide a fiscal back-
stop to preserve the stability of the financial system (see, for example, Cecchetti and Schoen-
holtz, 2017; Schoenmaker, 2015a). While making public funding available comes at the loss of 
market discipline, Cecchetti and Schoenholtz (2017) argued that some forms of moral hazard 
are unavoidable. They claimed that a resolution regime without the possibility of government 
funding in extreme circumstances is not credible. The lack of a credible resolution scheme 
also creates moral hazard: that a future government facing a crisis will enact a bailout just as 
the US government did with TARP (the Troubled Asset Relief Program) in 20081.
The fiscal backstop can be either direct to recapitalise ailing banks (with only partial or 
no bail-in), or indirect as a backstop for the central bank and the resolution and deposit 
insurance fund. Schoenmaker (2015a) provided an overview of the arguments on the need 
for a fiscal backstop in a fractional reserve banking system. The standing of a banking system 
depends on the strength and credibility of the fiscal backstop (Goodhart, 1998).
When assessing the need for a fiscal backstop, it is important to have an overview of the 
overall size of a banking system and the make-up of the system. Table 1 lists the world’s major 
banking systems and the largest banks within these banking systems. It shows that these large 
banks have $2-$3 trillion in total assets. It also illustrates that most of these large banks have a  
strong international presence with assets in the rest of the region and the rest of the world.
3 The international dimension
For international banks, the question arises whether the countries where the bank has a pres-
ence can jointly provide the fiscal backstop through some form of burden sharing (Goodhart 
and Schoenmaker, 2009; Faia and Weder di Mauro, 2016; Schoenmaker, 2016). A joint fiscal 
backstop, or a full backstop by the home country, for the entire bank facilitates single-point-
of-entry (SPE) resolution. By contrast, when the involved countries only stand behind the 
respective domestic parts of an international bank, multiple-point-of-entry (MPE) resolution 
is unavoidable.
1 This is an example of time inconsistency: when faced with a severe crisis, the government might break its prior 
commitment not to bail out in order to preserve financial stability.
Monetary stability Financial stability
Financial soundness
ObjectivesLevel
Economy
Individual
institutions
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Table 1: The major banking systems and their largest banks, 2015
Banking systems
Total assets 
($ billions)
Geographical spread
Home Region World
Euro-area banking system 30,208
BNP Paribas 2,166 25% 47% 28%
Groupe Crédit Agricole 1,845 81% 10% 8%
Deutsche Bank 1,769 26% 28% 46%
Santander 1,456 28% 43% 29%
Société Générale 1,449 72% 18% 11%
Groupe BPCE 1,267 91% 3% 6%
Unicredit Group 935 40% 57% 3%
ING Bank 911 36% 47% 17%
BBVA 815 39% 14% 47%
Commerzbank 579 52% 35% 13%
Large euro-area banks 13,192 49% 30% 22%
US banking system 15,564
JP Morgan Chase 2,352 77% 2% 21%
Bank of America 2,144 86% 1% 12%
Wells Fargo 1,788 97% 1% 2%
Citigroup 1,731 51% 9% 40%
Goldman Sachs 861 52% 4% 44%
Morgan Stanley 787 68% 4% 28%
Bank of New York Mellon 394 76% 0% 24%
State Street 245 74% 2% 24%
Large US banks 10,303 75% 3% 22%
Chinese banking system 30,730
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 3,421 93% 5% 3%
China Construction Bank 2,826 94% 3% 3%
Agricultural Bank of China 2,740 96% 2% 1%
Bank of China 2,590 73% 17% 10%
Large Chinese banks 11,577 90% 6% 4%
UK banking system 10,179
HSBC 2,410 36% 6% 58%
Barclays 1,651 40% 20% 40%
Royal Bank of Scotland 1,202 83% 5% 12%
Lloyds Banking Group 1,189 96% 2% 1%
Standard Chartered 640 18% 10% 72%
Large UK banks 7,092 53% 9% 38%
Japanese banking system 9,415
Mitsubishi UFJ FG 2,602 60% 9% 31%
Mizuho FG 1,883 65% 9% 26%
Sumitomo Mitsui FG 1,600 70% 8% 21%
Large Japanese banks 6,086 65% 9% 27%
Swiss banking system 3,027
UBS 942 33% 24% 43%
Credit Suisse 827 27% 20% 53%
Large Swiss banks 1,769 30% 22% 48%
Source: Schoenmaker (2017). Note: The geographical segmentation of assets covers the home country, the rest of the region or continent 
(Americas, Europe and Asia) and the rest of the world.
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Faia and Weder di Mauro (2016) found, on the basis of international banks’ resolution 
plans filed at the Federal Reserve, that the vast majority of banks aim for SPE resolution. 
But are these SPE resolution plans credible? Crisis management, with large sums of money 
involved, can be seen as a one-off event. Game theory indicates that in such a case countries 
will not cooperate2. The countries involved do not take into account any foreign externalities 
of a potential bank failure, and are only prepared (and politically authorised) to backstop 
their respective domestic part.
More formally, the financial trilemma states that the objectives of (1) financial stability, 
(2) international banking, and (3) national financial policies for supervision and resolution, 
are incompatible (Schoenmaker, 2013). Any two of the three policy objectives can be com-
bined but not all three; one has to give. Policymakers must choose between three equilibrium 
outcomes for the structure of the international banking system, which differ in viability and 
stability. Eatwell, Gossé and Alexander (2014) developed similar, though slightly different, 
scenarios. We find that the equilibrium outcomes for large international banks are as follows 
(Schoenmaker, 2016): 
A. Global banks, headquartered in large countries: giving up objective (1);
B. Multinational banks, based on national subsidiaries: giving up objective (2); and
C. Global or regional banks, based on burden sharing: giving up objective (3). 
The starting point for analysing these equilibria is the credibility of the banking system’s 
fiscal backstop. From earlier financial crises, we establish that the threshold for a credible 
fiscal backstop is about 8 percent of GDP (Hüttl and Schoenmaker, 2016). Systemic bank fail-
ures tend to be clustered because of common factors, such as a severe economic downturn, 
a housing bust and/or a currency crisis (Laeven and Valencia, 2013). Using a conservative 
scenario, we assume that up to three of a country’s largest banks might need to be recapital-
ised in a severe systemic crisis. Next, recapitalisation aims to restore the equity of the failing 
bank, provided that the financial stability benefits exceed recapitalisation costs. Dermine and 
Schoenmaker (2010) argued that a bank’s equity is a good proxy for recapitalisation costs. 
Recapitalisation is standardised at 4.5 percent of total assets in our calculations.
Table 2 shows that the potential bailout costs for the top three banks range from 1.6 to 3.7 
percent of GDP for large economies, such as China, the US and the euro area. Japan follows 
closely with 6.6 percent of GDP. These figures are sufficiently low to make a fiscal backstop for 
the large banks in these countries credible (equilibrium A, with SPE resolution). Table 2 also 
shows that the potential fiscal costs for Germany, Italy and Austria are within the 4 to 5 per-
cent range, but these countries are not home to global banks with €2-€3 trillion in total assets, 
with the exception of Deutsche Bank. 
The other euro-area countries (with large banks) and the UK and Switzerland face poten-
tial fiscal costs for bailing out the largest banks ranging from 8.4 to 13.5 percent of GDP. The 
credibility of the fiscal backstop for these countries can be questioned, both in terms of the 
budgetary capacity (exceeding the indicative hurdle rate of 8 percent of GDP) and the political 
willingness to spend such large amounts. We should note that these calculations do not take 
into account (partial) bail-in, which would lower the potential costs for the government, or 
the fiscal space of individual countries.
The European countries made different choices in the aftermath of the Great Financial 
Crisis. The United Kingdom and Switzerland have enacted major reforms (both structural 
reforms and higher capital charges) with the official aim of increasing the resilience of their 
banking systems, and the intended side effect of simultaneously downsizing their large banks 
and reducing their foreign activities. The new requirements have been disproportionally 
2 This is an example of the prisoner’s dilemma: a standard example of a game analysed in game theory that shows 
why two completely ‘rational’ individuals might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to 
do so.
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stringent on the largest banks compared to the rest of the banking system. One example is 
the Vickers separation of retail and wholesale banking, which affects the large UK banks. 
The main purpose of this separation is to limit the contingent liability of the UK taxpayer to 
support the British banking system (Goodhart, 2012). Moreover, the UK and Switzerland have 
imposed higher capital surcharges than other countries on their large banks. The UK and 
Switzerland have implicitly opted for equilibrium B, with MPE resolution.
Table 2: Potential fiscal costs for major countries, 2015 (% of GDP)
Countries
Assets 
in $ billion
Recapitalisation  
in $ billion
Fiscal costs 
% of GDP
Top 3 banks China 8,987 404 3.7%
Top 3 banks US 6,086 274 1.6%
Top 3 banks Japan 6,023 271 6.6%
Top 3 banks Euro Area 5,781 260 2.3%
   Top 3 banks France* 5,465 246 10.2%
   Top 3 banks Germany* 2,794 126 3.7%
   Top 3 banks Spain* 2,646 119 9.9%
   Top 3 banks Netherlands* 2,064 93 12.3%
   Top 3 banks Italy* 1,854 83 4.6%
Top 3 banks UK 5,262 237 8.4%
Top 3 banks Switzerland 1.989 90 13.5%
Source: Hüttl and Schoenmaker (2016). Notes: The largest three home country banks (ie headquartered in the home country) are chosen 
for each jurisdiction. Recapitalisation is standardised at 4.5 percent of total assets. The fiscal costs represent the potential fiscal costs of 
recapitalising the largest three banks as percentage of GDP. The countries indicated by * are members of the European banking union.
By contrast, the major euro-area countries have implemented some lighter ‘Liikanen’ 
reforms (Liikanen, 2012) than the UK and Switzerland. With the implementation of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), the euro area 
can already be considered as a single jurisdiction, based on SPE resolution within the euro 
area (equilibrium C). An open issue is whether policymakers will shift the fiscal backstop for 
the euro-area banking system from the country to the euro-area level (see section 4). Table 2 
suggests that the required fiscal backstop for the euro-area banking system would amount to 
$260 billion (which is €230 billion at today’s exchange rate). The European Stability Mecha-
nism (ESM) provides a fiscal backstop of €500 billion for country members and banks, which 
seems to be more than sufficient. There is currently a limit of €60 billion for direct recapitali-
sation of banks (ESM, 2014), but that can be raised if and when needed.
4 Policy recommendations
To encourage bail-in to the maximum extent possible (the micro objective of resolution to 
foster market discipline), we can redesign the system to minimise the macro concerns (the 
macro objective of resolution to maintain financial stability). We make several recommenda-
tions to reduce the potential macro impact.
Reducing the potential for bank contagion
We first look at direct contagion within the banking system. The current capital treatment of 
bank instrument holdings is symmetric and works as follows. A bank needs to deduct hold-
ings of bank equity from its core-equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital, while holdings of CoCos, which 
form additional Tier 1 capital (AT1), are deducted from AT1 capital, and holdings of subordi-
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nated debt, which is known as Tier 2 capital (T2), are deducted from T2 capital3. Similarly, the 
European Commission proposed in November 2016 to deduct holdings of bail-inable debt in 
other banks from a bank’s own bail-inable debt4.
We recommend that all bank instrument holdings should be deducted from CET1 capital. 
At bail-in, CoCos (AT1), subordinated debt (T2) and bail-inable debt are either converted into 
equity or lead directly to a loss. In both cases, the surviving bank, holding this paper, has to 
deduct the bailed-in amount – either as new bank equity holdings or as a realised loss– from 
its own CET1 capital. When a bank holds extra capital for this event (ie the bank has already 
deducted any bank instrument holdings from its CET1 capital requirement in advance), the 
bank can absorb losses from these holdings and the second round effect of the first bank 
failing is limited. By contrast, the current symmetric treatment leads to second-round effects, 
as banks have to deduct bailed-in debt from their CET1 capital. If as a consequence their 
CET1 ratio dropped below their required CET1 ratio, a further round of bail-ins would be 
triggered – and further subsequent rounds as necessary. While small bank failures will not 
set off substantial second-round effects, medium-sized and large bank failures can cause a 
cascade of losses through the banking system under the current combination of bail-in and 
capital regulations.
The systemic capital surcharge for global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) is not 
enough to absorb losses from bail-in debt, which can amount to 1.5 percent of total assets. 
The average G-SIB surcharge is 1.33 percent of risk-weighted assets. As the risk-weighted 
assets form about 34 percent of total assets for G-SIBs, the surcharge is then only 0.45 percent 
(= 34 percent * 1.33 percent) of total assets (Schoenmaker, 2017).
Moreover, banks are allowed to apply a lower risk weight to bank exposures than to cor-
porate exposures, which provides banks with an incentive to hold bank bonds. If the above 
recommendation of full deduction of bail-inable bank bond holdings from CET1 capital is not 
followed, we propose at the minimum that unsecured or subordinated bank bonds should 
be given a similar risk weight to comparable corporate bonds. That would end the favourable 
treatment of bank bonds. The recommended strict treatment of deducting bail-inable bank 
instruments from CET1 capital and/or the higher risk weights for these instruments would 
raise banks’ funding costs, because contagion risks would become partly internalised by the 
banking system. The higher capital requirements might help push bank bonds outside the 
core banking system.
Turning to indirect contagion, it is important that the supervisor, lender of last resort and 
resolution authority work together to combat information-induced banking crises, such as 
the potential writing down of subordinated debt during the Irish banking crisis. The European 
Central Bank (ECB) argued strongly against a write down to prevent information contagion to 
the wider European banking system, which was financed with large amounts of subordinated 
debt. However, Ireland had to pay the bill of higher bail-out costs on its own. In an earlier 
assessment (Schoenmaker, 2015b), we argued that these costs should have been shared at the 
European level because the stability benefits accrued to the entire European banking system. 
Sapir and Schoenmaker (2017) argued for an integrated approach with the ECB as supervisor 
and lender of last resort, a newly formed Single Resolution and Deposit Insurance Board as 
resolution and deposit insurance authority, and the ESM for direct capitalisation.
3 For equity see Article 36 of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR; EU/575/2013), for CoCos Articles 45-48 of 
the CRR and for Tier 2 capital Articles 56-60 of the CRR. 
4 The requirement to hold bail-inable debt is technically called Minimum Requirement for Own Funds and Eligible 
Liabilities (MREL) and amounts to 8 percent on top of a bank’s capital. The European Commission proposed 
in November 2016 to deduct bail-inable debt holdings from a bank’s own MREL (see Amendment to CRR/
EU/575/2013; COM (2016) 850 final). This proposed requirement is only for global systemically important banks 
(G-SIBs) and for holdings of bail-inable bonds of G-SIBs. 
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Strengthening the fiscal backstop
Large institutional investors, such as insurance companies and pension funds, are well-
placed to absorb banking losses in return for a higher interest rate (risk premium on bail-ina-
ble bank bonds). But during a very deep financial crisis when asset returns are correlated, the 
authorities might need to support the wider financial system. The presence of a strong and 
credible fiscal backstop to the banking system and the wider financial system is thus impor-
tant to maintain financial stability.
We recommend that the euro-area countries organise the fiscal backstop at the euro-
area level. The ESM was created as fiscal backstop for member countries with sovereign debt 
problems. Under the current arrangements, it provides a very partial backstop to the banking 
union banking system. A member country can receive an ESM loan to recapitalise its banks 
(the indirect recapitalisation of Article 15 ESM Treaty). Only when a member’s fiscal sustain-
ability is in danger (ESM, 2014), can the ESM directly recapitalise banks from that member 
country under certain conditions (eg an own contribution by the member country and a 
bail-in of 8 percent of a bank’s total liabilities) and with unanimity of votes, which might lead 
to protracted negotiations with an uncertain outcome. The current ESM Direct Recapitalisa-
tion Instrument falls thus short of being an ex-ante credible fiscal backstop at the euro-area 
level.
A first step to complete the ESM as a fiscal backstop to the banking system would be to 
enable direct bank recapitalisation from the ESM, without first waiting for the country to go 
bankrupt and subsequently meeting prohibitive conditions and voting procedures. A second 
step would be to establish a Single Resolution and Deposit Insurance Fund, with a credit line 
from the ESM, similar to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which has a US 
Treasury credit line (Gros and Schoenmaker, 2014).
Reducing bail-in debt held by households 
The final recommendation concerns the holdings of bail-inable bank debt by households. 
These large holdings can be explained by the fact that the bail-inable bonds are seemingly 
attractive to households because they offer a higher interest rate than savings accounts with 
deposit insurance. However, the higher interest rate reflects the higher risk of bail-in without 
deposit protection.
In the context of the resolvability assessment, the Single Resolution Board (SRB) has to 
evaluate the effective bail-inability of certain liabilities. An important element of this eval-
uation is the holding structure of these liabilities (since liabilities held by retail investors 
are more difficult to bail in)5. While the SRB can estimate the percentage of retail holders, it 
cannot assess whether the individual holders of the liabilities can bear the losses. The holders 
– and their financial position – cannot be known for publicly issued and traded securities. 
Moreover, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD; 2014/59/EU) does not allow 
discrimination between different holders of debt of the same class when bailing in. Neverthe-
less, in its communication the SRB discourages banks from selling bail-inable instruments to 
retail clients and encourages banks to ensure maximum disclosure on potential bail-in risk.
To avoid mis-selling, the conduct-of-business supervisor should ensure that banks fully 
explain the riskiness of these bail-inable bonds to households (see also Philippon and. Salord, 
2017). These risks include not only the usual losses at failure but also the possibility of conver-
sion into equity prior to failure.
Experience suggests that it is very difficult for the average household to fully grasp these 
risks (Abrue and Mendes, 2010). Moreover, marketing of bail-inable bank bonds is often 
aimed at a bank’s own customers (ie depositors), which perceive their banks as safe. Such 
captive selling is very delicate. A bank will have to tell its customers simultaneously that it is 
5 The SRB receives the information on the holding structure through the Liability Data Template, which is collected 
for MREL purposes.
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safe to deposit their money in the bank, but that buying the same banks’ bonds might entail 
losses. In practice, the bank often promotes its bonds to its customers as attractive because of 
the higher interest rate, with limited explanation of the risks.
At the macro-level, households will ultimately bear the loss of bail-in. The key point here 
is that households should not individually become too exposed to bail-inable debt. The risk 
should rather be spread through participation by households in funds, either directly in 
mutual funds or indirectly in pension funds or insurance companies.
An alternative solution to strengthened conduct-of-business supervision would be that 
regulation could ban the sale of bail-inable bonds to non-professionals. In that way, the reso-
lution authority would face less political pressure to suppress bail-in.
5 Conclusions
The new resolution regimes adopted in the EU and the US have an important and welcome 
disciplining effect on the banking sector. However, the impact of bail-in on the wider banking 
system has not so far received sufficient attention. This Policy Contribution highlights the 
need for a macro approach to resolution to complement the current micro approach. This 
macro approach should consider the contagion effects of bail-in and stress the continuing 
need for a fiscal backstop.
A large volume of bail-inable bank bonds is held by the banking sector, which increases 
the potential for direct contagion because losses are distributed throughout the banking 
sector. This weakens the banking sector when bank failures happen. The favourable capital 
treatment of bank bonds encourages banks to buy these products. We recommend stricter 
capital requirements for bail-inable bank bonds, which would push them to non-banks, such 
as insurance companies and pension funds.
Even when bail-inable bank bonds are held more widely, there remains a need for a fiscal 
backstop to the financial system in the case of a full-blown financial crisis. To complete the 
banking union, we recommend that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) becomes 
the fiscal backstop to the euro-area banking system. The ESM would then be able directly 
to recapitalise ailing banks and to provide a credit line to the Single Resolution and Deposit 
Insurance Fund, if and when needed.
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